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Below you’ll ﬁnd the transcript of an interview with Robin Milner, held in Cam-
bridge on the 3. September 2003. The interview was conducted by Martin Berger.
Thanks to Kohei Honda, Keith Clarke, Carla Benjamin and Tony Stockman for
their help and suggestions.
Martin Berger: When and where were you born and into what kind of family back-
ground?
Robin Milner: My father was an army oﬃcer. I was born in 1934 in Plymouth on
the south coast and because we were an army family we moved about quite a lot. I
remember we ended up living in Scotland during the war, in Edinburgh. I think we
moved to Edinburgh when I was about ﬁve. I lived in Edinburgh for three years,
then I went to school in Wales. This was a private school which was evacuated to
Wales because of the war and eventually it moved back after the war and so I went
back with it to Kent. It was a school where normally people would pay a lot of
money but we didn’t have a lot of money. But I had a kind of scholarship, because
I was being trained so that I should get a scholarship to one of the so-called public
schools after that.
So your parents put emphasis on your academic achievements?
Well, there was something like that. When I was thirteen, I took a scholarship exam
to one of the public schools, Eton College, that most people know about. I got in,
and that was the beginning of what you might call a fast-track education for me.
Do you have brothers or sisters?
I have one sister, yes, she’s older than I am. She lives in Wales, she is retired now.
She has a family, one son. He has children. She is a widow, unfortunately. She
looks after a herb garden in Wales.
You went to Eton College: what favourite subjects did you have there?
I was always more interested in maths than anything else, but as you probably know
in those days classical education was essential in that sort of school.
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Did you learn Greek or Latin?
I learned Greek from the age of ten and Latin from the age of eight and I regarded
them both as a kind of defective form of mathematics because they were taught
with such accuracy. But as far as classical culture is concerned we weren’t taught
as much as we might have been. In any case, I wasn’t particularly interested in
history. But I could write Latin verse, because Latin verse was very accurate and
there is no doubt what syllables should be long, what syllables should be short: as
I say, a defective form of mathematics.
Of course I was doing real mathematics too, and I was allowed to do it full time,
as it were, from the age of sixteen. There was a good teacher at my prep-school,
that is, when I was eight to thirteen, whom I learned a lot from, simply because he
enjoyed it so much. There was at least one other at Eton College, I remember he
was in charge of all the rowing as well, but I remember he was inspiring, he taught
me projective geometry. And he found it so beautiful that we found it beautiful,
too. That was a good experience. That took me up to the age of eighteen. Then I
took a scholarship to Cambridge. I went to King’s.
What year did you go to Cambridge?
I took my scholarship to Cambridge in 1952 but then I did my national military
service. That took me to ’54.
You went to the army before Cambridge?
Yes.
I’m terrible at history: did you get involved with the Korean war?
It was around that time and two of the people in my group went to Korea, but I
didn’t. I went to the Suez Canal. At the time, the British were still in charge.
Must have been warm there.
It’s quite warm and very dry. It doesn’t rain because it is so dry. I didn’t enjoy the
army particularly, but my father was in the army, so I took it seriously.
Did your parents understand your fascination with mathematics or did they just look
bemused?
Oh no, they didn’t understand mathematics or scholarship in general, but certainly
they supported me.
You could not go to your mother or father and ask ”please explain”, say, ”probability
distributions to me”?
Oh no! No one in the family at all. But that was ﬁne, because I went to a boarding
school. I lived there for eight months of the year. So I had plenty of people to talk
to. Because the education system is very strange in this country – we have these
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private schools – they are a hothouse, but one of the things that you learn is to
work extremely hard. The standard of how much work you do, particularly if you
are supposed to be doing that sort of thing, as opposed to just being a sportsman,
is very high. You learn that it’s natural to spend all night thinking about a mathe-
matical problem, rather than going to sleep. That sort of thing came naturally there.
At Eton College you didn’t feel you stood out as being particularly studious?
Oh no, because there was a group of about 70 scholars, who would be separate
from the rest of the school and were regarded as collectively mad by the rest of the
school. So that was alright.
Is any of these people, your friends at Eton College, famous today?
Oh yes, for example Richard Layard, he’s Lord Layard now, is at the London School
of Economics, a very eﬀective economist, splendid person. They were very good peo-
ple and I enjoyed them very much.
In the army, did you do normal grunt-work or did you get involved with things like
cryptography?
Oh no! I was an oﬃcer in the Royal Engineers, I looked after the heavy machinery
... bulldozers ... I was in charge of training people to drive bulldozers and big mobile
buckets.
Was this a childhood dream of yours?
No it wasn’t a childhood dream of mine. Absolutely not! In particular, I didn’t have
a childhood dream to move sand. What we were doing was digging holes in the sand.
Then you went to King’s in Cambridge?
Yes, in ’54.
How did you ﬁnd the transition? You studied math?
Yes, I studied maths for two years. Because of the exam I had taken, I did leave out
the ﬁrst year and I started at the second year, which was probably a mistake be-
cause I had lost touch after two years in the army. But I took the degree essentially
after two years, the main degree paper, although I had to be resident at Cambridge
for three years. In 1956 I went on a course on the EDSAC machine here. I regarded
programming as really rather inelegant. You’d write one instruction after the other,
and it was all rather arbitrary. It seemed to me that programming was not a very
beautiful thing. So I resolved that I would never go near a computer in my life!
This programming course was part of your university studies?
No, it was a ten day course in the summer. Of course I had not realised what
a tremendous achievement the digital computer was. I didn’t know about Turing
at the time. So I didn’t know about the logical work. It was because of my own
ignorance that I didn’t appreciate what was going on. From October ’56 I changed
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to philosophy. I took History of Philosophy. I also did a certain amount of analyti-
cal philosophy at that time. I got interested in and puzzled by Russell’s theory of
descriptions and names. It’s relevant to what we think about these days. But when
I left Cambridge, although people suggested I might stay, I was tired of academic
things.
It seems a bit surprising that you could have been in Cambridge in the 1950s and
not be aware of Turing’s groundbreaking work.
Yes it does look strange, doesn’t it, but this groundbreaking work was very much
in logic. Interestingly enough, the computing people in Cambridge were not partic-
ularly interested in the theoretical side of it.
They were not mathematicians?
No. The engineering achievement was the main thing about the EDSAC computer,
which was built in ’49. That was a great achievement, but the link between that
work and Turing’s work wasn’t really made very obvious. Turing had been a fellow
at King’s College, but he died, I discovered later, a few months before I arrived.
The man who taught me maths at King’s was a friend of Turing’s. But I didn’t
realise that because we didn’t talk about Turing. So I didn’t know about him at
all.
Your mathematical education was not really on the logical side?
No, logic came much later, when I was about 29, 30. ’63, ’64. In ’64 I began to
learn about logic, about recursion theory and all those things, while I was at City.
What did you do after Cambridge, before you went to City?
I went to London and did some part-time jobs. I became a school teacher for one
year in ’59.
Primary or high-school?
This was in a secondary school. A so-called grammar school. Then I left that, in
1960, after one year and went into Ferranti, where I did programming for three years.
Despite your objections?
Yes. I didn’t move into it with great enthusiasm, but I realised that I should get a
job.
It sounds like you were quite unsure at the time.
I was. Completely unsure. At Ferranti I looked after a program library.
That was in London?
This was in London, yes. I made sure that all the new machines they were selling
were actually working. I had a ﬁrst experience of writing a compiler or part of a
compiler. Then I thought, perhaps I should get an academic job, which I did: I went
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to City University in 1963. And there I had a kind of double life: I taught maths
to engineers, which was very routine, but I also began to get interested in AI. I was
particularly interested in CPL, a programming language inspired by Christopher
Strachey, which eventually led via BCPL to C which everyone knows.
You didn’t have a PhD at the time?
No, I never had a PhD.
It was no problem getting teaching positions without?
No, no problem. You must realise that City University had until recently been a
College of Advanced Technology and it had just been made into a University. But
in any case, at that time – and even now – you don’t have to have a PhD to get
a job in this country. We are fairly unique in that respect, but I was still in the
minority. I never had the experience of a PhD, and in some ways perhaps what I
did was rather more independent than if I had done a PhD. I was not guided. I
simply guided myself.
I got interested in relational algebra, particularly because of databases. I wondered
what the status of this was – Tarski’s relational algebra. Of course this related
to Artiﬁcial Intelligence; I wasn’t interested in intelligence per se, but I was inter-
ested in automated question-answering, perhaps question-answering in relation to a
database. That was an example of using algebra or logic – an algebraic logic really
– to formulate questions and answers. I didn’t get very far with that. What really
sparked me oﬀ was getting interested in program veriﬁcation and what semantics
might mean.
When I went to Swansea in 1968 I took a research job, I gave up teaching and
became a research assistant with David Cooper who was head of the department
in Swansea. He had a small group there, working on program veriﬁcation and au-
tomatic theorem-proving and semantics. That was at the time when Dana Scott
produced his famous domain theory. He gave a series of talks then, in ’69, and I
went over to Oxford and heard him. That was very exciting.
So, in some sense, it began to move very fast. The idea of a machine proving theo-
rems in logic, and the idea of using logic to understand what a machine was doing ...
this double relationship began to inspire me because it was clearly not very simple.
The relationship wasn’t just an inverse relationship ”I bite you and you bite me”:
the computer says: ”I will automate your logic” and the logic says ”I will tell you
what your programs mean”. These are two diﬀerent relationships.
Of course you already have this in classical mathematics where you formalise logic,
but you also give meaning to and reason about logic using logic. They claim there
are these hierarchies of (meta-)languages, but actually it’s the same thing really.
Yes, I suppose it’s the same thing. I wasn’t aware of that of course. In particular,
it comes to life with computing.
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Your interest in relational algebra, databases, program veriﬁcation, was it triggered
by some speciﬁc problems you needed to solve or was it general intellectual curios-
ity? Were these questions in the air at the time?
Oh yes, these were things one could do to get into the academic side of the subject.
I wrote an automatic theorem prover in Swansea for myself and became shattered
with the diﬃculty of doing anything interesting in that direction and I still am. I
greatly admired Robinson’s resolution principle, a wonderful breakthrough; but in
fact the amount of stuﬀ you can prove with fully automatic theorem proving is still
very small. So I was always more interested in amplifying human intelligence than
I am in artiﬁcial intelligence.
That means I began to be interested in how one could verify programs. I knew
about Floyd’s work. Tony Hoare was working on that sort of thing, too. I got
to know him during that time. Of course I applied my theorem-prover to Floyd
assertions. I generated veriﬁcation conditions from programs. But then it took
ages to prove them. My theorem-prover couldn’t do it. I then thought ”shall I
prove a real program”? So I got a chemist, I forget his name, he had written a
Fortran program in connection with his research, and I thought, let’s prove some
things about this. I was fascinated by the fact that the program was quite diﬃcult;
he was using Fortran arrays to encode his own matrices, but he was embedding
them all in one big Fortran array for eﬃciency reasons. So you had this interesting
representational problem. The problem of verifying was a problem of simulation or
data representation, and I realised how big a problem that was going to be.
In fact, out of that I got interested in simulation, which I did a bit of work on.
But only simulation between programs. It wasn’t a very mathematically profound
piece of work, though Tony Hoare was very nice about it. But the idea of some-
thing concrete representing something more abstract was obviously important. So,
what the human does is to abstract from concrete representation, no matter what
that representation is. That’s the essence of the relationship between algorithm and
program.
What was the next step for you?
Then I visited the United States during that period once with David Cooper. We
went to Carnegie-Mellon, and there was Zohar Manna who had been working with
McCarthy at Stanford. I spoke to Zohar Manna about what I had been doing with
program schemata and veriﬁcation. As a result I got a job with McCarthy from
1970, from the beginning of ’71, at the AI lab in Stanford.
The interesting thing there was, they were just looking for somebody who would
do something practical. Scott had recently produced a kind of logic of domains, a
logic of the hierarchy of domains, a type-theoretic hierarchy, This to me seemed to
be something which was practical. That is what LCF came out of. Since I was so
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interested in human-assisted – or I would say machine-assisted– proof, this seemed
to be a wonderful opportunity for a program-oriented logic. It really took oﬀ for
me when I realised that I could write down the syntax of a programming language
in this logic and I could write the semantics in the logic. I could also write down
the semantic function in the logic.
That was a domain-theoretic semantics?
Yes. I could write the translator from some trivial high-level language to some triv-
ial assembly code. I could write down all four sides of the commuting diagram which
says: you could do compilation and then take the semantics of the target code, or
take the semantics of the source language and encode it in the target semantics,
and you get the same answer. One of the ﬁrst things we did in LCF was to verify
– in principle verify – that commuting diagram. It was quite a big step. But it
was much more easy to verify the compiler than it was to verify a single computer
program!
In what sense do you understand ”verifying a compiler”? Does it assume that you
have the semantics of assembly language and the semantics of the high-level lan-
guage?
Yes.
What did you use as semantics of your assembly language? The state transitions of
some microprocessor?
Yes.
So you went to a very considerable amount of detail?
There was a certain encoding of the semantic objects of the source language. It
wasn’t as though we were the ﬁrst people to think about it. The advice was ”use
algebra”! Essentially, we were using algebra, the representation of one algebra in
another, a lot of the time in Stanford.
But meanwhile I got somehow interested, and I don’t know how, in concurrency.
I remember that, without linking it to veriﬁcation particularly, I wondered about
interacting automata. I had an idea that automata theory was inadequate, because
it hadn’t said what it was for two automata to interact with each other. Except for
the Krohn-Rhodes Representation Theorem, which said something about feeding
the output of one automata into another. But there wasn’t interaction between the
automata.
At the time the internet was developed in southern California you were in Stanford.
And what about the work on object-orientation? They were thinking about sending
messages between objects. Did that inﬂuence you?
I don’t know. Maybe. I did know simulation languages. I’d done some work, not
published work, but I did understand simulation languages back in ’63, ’65 because
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Simula was invented in ’63 or ’64 or something like that. We had a lot of simulation
languages then. Simulation intrigued me because it was about how you represent
the real world inside a computer. I remember being puzzled by how to deﬁne the
agents in a simulated process. For example if you have humans passing buckets
down the chain, then you simulate the humans, but shouldn’t you simulate the
buckets in exactly the same way? From the bucket’s point of view, the humans are
moving past the bucket, from the human’s point of view, the buckets are moving
past the humans. So there was some extraordinary looseness about what could be
meant by representing a real-world process.
If you approach things from the simulation angle, then many models of computa-
tion must be inadequate: Turing-Machines, Lambda-Calculus, Shannon’s theorem
... They all are extremely informal about what it means to get information from
one entity to another.
You are probably right, but knowing about simulation languages must have been
one of the reasons that I though automata ought to interact with one another. Of
course I didn’t know about Petri’s work, which again began in ’63. I didn’t know
that at all. But what struck me later was that the great thing about Petri was that
he had actually worried about automata theory and what interaction between au-
tomata might mean. Here is one transition diagram and here is another transition
diagram, but this transition in the left diagram must coincide with that transition
in the right diagram. And that sharing-of-a-transition is how Petri represented
communication.
The intriguing thing about Petri’s work is that he was talking about how two au-
tomata could interact, and he then put the whole into one Petri-net and he didn’t
do it in a modular way. But the fact that he used this to represent oﬃce systems
and real-world information systems showed that he had set his sights really quite
high.
Wasn’t he interested in formal models of physical information exchange?
I think so, but he also applied his model to oﬃce systems. I don’t honestly remem-
ber when I got aware of his work. Certainly, when I worked on CCS much later,
I got aware of it. In the late ’70s, I visited him, but by that time he was much
more interested in modular semantics, because the great thing about denotational
semantics was that it was compositional in the most accurate sense of the word
”compositional”.
The concurrency theory at the time was more of a side-issue?
It was, but secretly I realised then that working in veriﬁcation and automatic
theorem-proving was to me very exciting but it wasn’t getting to the heart of com-
putation theory. What it was doing was providing assistance to people who had real
concerns about correctness, but it was Dana Scott’s work that was getting to the
heart of computation and the meaning of computation. I wanted to do something
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which would carry that understanding into the wider ﬁeld. I was concerned not to
only work with computer-assisted proof, though that was going to be very important
part of it, but also to ask what the limits of computation may be. This interac-
tion business began to seem to me to be breaking the mould, breaking the limits
what people have been trying to understand in a mathematical way up to that point.
Was it easy for you to communicate these ideas to the community at the time? Some-
thing like the Church-Turing Thesis must have been very powerful. I can imagine
people saying ”everything is a Turing-Machine. What’s the need for other models”?
Did you encounter this attitude or did people react with an open mind to your sug-
gestions?
Some people did. I went to a conference in ’73 in Pisa. This was a working confer-
ence. Italians were also very interested at that time. So my ﬁrst paper on processes,
which I was trying to do in a domain-theoretic way, was about that time. Seman-
ticists were trying to apply semantic ideas of a familiar kind to concurrency, which
was an unfamiliar thing for it.
Did you get a temporary or permanent position in Edinburgh?
I got a permanent position in 1973. That was coming back from the States, which
was a good thing because we wanted our family to be educated in Europe, not in
America.
Before we go to Edinburgh, can you say a little bit more about your own family?
When did you get married?
Yes. I got married in ’63. We had our children while I was living in London, working
in City University, between ’63 and ’68.
How many children have you got?
I had three, but one of my children died. I have two now, a son and a daughter,
and each of them has a daughter. My daughter lives in Scotland now. She teaches
yoga and previously ran a cafe which trains handicapped people. Anyway, we go
up there quite a lot, seeing that family. And we also see my son’s daughter when
we go to Australia, which we don’t very often.
Your son lives in Australia?
No, he lives here, you see. But he goes to Australia to see her.
What does your son do?
He’s a teacher, in Reading.
You didn’t inspire your children to be Pi-calculists?
I didn’t try. I probably avoided trying in the early days; on the whole I’m quite
happy to leave it to people to discover it themselves if they have any particular
inspiration in that direction.
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What did you do at Cambridge when you were not studying?
I spent most of my time in university doing music; as a student in Cambridge I
didn’t meet most mathematicians. Most of my social life was to do with playing
chamber music. I’m an oboist, or I was then. I was wondering if I should be a musi-
cian. I was wondering if I should train properly, late, and be a professional musician.
You played to quite a high standard.
Yes, I was quite good.
What kind of music does interest you?
Mostly classical music.
I mean within classical music: 20th century? Bach? ...
Everything. Everything. I think there are wonderful pieces of music from every
style and there are awful pieces of music. There are awful pieces of Beethoven and
there are wonderful pieces of Beethoven. I was listening to Dido and Aeneas the
other night; Purcell is brilliant, but not always. Bach is occasionally boring and
some 20th century music is wonderful, some Brahms is awful, some Brahms is ac-
tually wonderful. I think you must recognise what is really exciting despite – or
independently of – the idiom.
Why did you not become a musician in the end?
I don’t know. I think because I don’t compose music, I wasn’t very good at that,
although I understand about harmony very well, but I wasn’t very creative. Other
things? I realised that I was perhaps training a bit late. But I never wanted to do
mathematics as a hobby, so I decided to keep music as a hobby! I played in good
amateur orchestras.
You don’t play anymore?
No I don’t play anymore.
Do you get asked if there’s a connection between your formal work and your musical
ability?
My answer is: yes, why not? Certainly mathematicians are interested in music.
Perhaps they are interested in the structure of music. Whether mathematics has
any relationship to what you would regard as musical phrasing, or tone-colour or
passion in music, I doubt.
Or the other way round: is your mathematical creativity linked to your musical abil-
ity?
I don’t know. I think one has a certain idea about what’s elegant. And that’s close
to what you do though not exactly the same thing, but I certainly recognise a lot
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of inelegant work, both in computing and in music, including some of my own.
Semantics to me is about aesthetics to a large degree.
Yes, although there are criteria, stern criteria, for saying what is correct, what is
mathematically viable. For example, compositionality, in some rigorous sense, you
do need that. But beyond that ...
The Petri-net community says compositionality is uninteresting.
They have in the past, but they were wrong of course. They are changing now.
But they were right about plenty of other things, so I’m happy to say they were
wrong here, without being too critical. Petri nets were actually an extraordinarily
important development in understanding concurrency.
I seem to remember that Don Knuth once said his early students were all musical
while his later ones were into extreme sports. Did you notice similar shifts?
I couldn’t make a link with that.
Then you went to Edinburgh to take up a professorship?
I took up a lectureship.
Why did you want you children to be educated in Europe?
On the whole, we tended to ﬁnd that American children grow up too fast, particu-
larly in California. And we had no intention of living ourselves in America forever,
so if we stayed there, it would be living for ourselves. In any case, how we wanted
to live and how we wanted to bring our children up were connected strongly, so we
wanted to come back. Edinburgh was a good place to go to. It just happened to
have a job at the time.
What was your goal in Edinburgh?
I think I was doing these two things: I went on with the veriﬁcation work, but I
also wanted to make concurrency the main intellectual challenge, although the two
were very close to each other. Some ﬁrst-class people came to work with me on
on theorem proving and the LCF stuﬀ: Malcolm Newey, Lockwood Morris, Mike
Gordon, Chris Wadsworth. We did devise a system which itself didn’t immedi-
ately get applied a great deal, but Mike Gordon brought it to Cambridge – this
was the LCF system. He started doing hardware veriﬁcation. And then one or
two other people began to design veriﬁcations systems, or rather systems to per-
form computer-assisted proof, on the model of our system, particularly Constable
at Cornell with his NuPrl.
The idea was that you had a metalanguage – which we called ML – in which you
were expressing your proof strategies, and that there was a rigorous discipline in
the way that you could steer your theorem prover so that it could not break the
logical rules. That was the pillar of our design. So much so that we would refuse
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to be eﬃcient if we would be breaking the rules. We wouldn’t encode some proof
procedure in assembly code or directly in Lisp. It would all have to go via the
execution of the logical rules of inference. So if you stayed late at night working out
a proof with the computer, you wouldn’t have to think afterwards ”gosh, did I cut
a few corners?”, because the LCF system just wouldn’t have allowed you to do so!
Of course, it had some features which would help you to express your thoughts on
how a proof might go.
Including proof tactics and things like that?
Yes, The intellectual challenge there was: how do you have a believable proof assis-
tant, how do you structure the ways in which we go about ﬁnding proofs, deﬁning
bigger strategies in terms of smaller strategies and so on. That developed, but
mostly through the medium of other systems, like Mike Gordon’s system here in
Cambridge. He designed his HOL Higher Order Logic system along the principles
of LCF. That was very nice. I was busy with that in the second half of the ’70s very
much, but at the same time developing my ideas on concurrency, and CCS came up
about 1980, 1979.
Before we talk more about CCS, can you say a few words about ML, one of the big
consequences of your work on proof assistants. When did you realise that you had
a general purpose language at your hands that might be useful in all sorts of other
contexts?
That was very interesting because we didn’t really try to do that. That was not
entirely due to our insights. It was partly due to Luca Cardelli who now works at
Microsoft Labs here. He was a student at that time of Gordon Plotkin’s, and he
took our implementation of ML and implemented it on a faster machine, because
he wanted to process some formulae for his thesis, as far as I remember, which
was on concurrency. In any case, being a fast implementer, within a few weeks he
implemented ML on a diﬀerent machine and that happened to be the machine on
which we could teach the students. And somebody else – I can’t remember who
it was – decided to that they would teach ML to the second year undergraduates
on that machine. Through this sequence of events, we began to realise that we did
have something that was ready to be used generally. In fact people began to pro-
duce diﬀerent dialects of ML – I forget what the exact sequence of events was; that
was all through the ’80s, for diﬀerent machine-assisted proof systems. Including the
French. CAML came about at that time. The French, led by Ge´rard Huet, were
using it for machine-assisted proof as well.
Eventually, about 1983, we thought we would pull together the diﬀerent dialects
and make one language out of them. That’s how Standard ML evolved. It took
about 7 years, from ’83 to ’90. In the end it looks like a lot of hard work! What
we got in the end was a formally deﬁned programming language, which is used
a reasonable amount; and it stands up as a paradigm of how you might deﬁne a
language rigorously. At the same time it is a working language. It stands well in
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that way. But it’s not used worldwide as much one might hope or expect. I think
that’s because it is very diﬃcult to evolve a language at the same time as evolving
its semantics. Languages do evolve, in ways which don’t sit easily with formal se-
mantics. We haven’t discovered how to evolve semantics.
What do you mean by evolving programming languages or semantics? Can you il-
lustrate this with an example?
Yes. I’m not sure this is the best example, but think of the type system of ML:
there is no particular respect paid to record handling. There have been a lot of
theories about types for record handling, very important type systems for record
handling, but it’s not in there, in ML. The reason it’s not in there is because we
didn’t understand how to prove the theorems and how to get it right. It would have
been nice if ML could have evolved in the direction of a type system for records;
but making sure that these theorems hold, making sure that ”well-typed programs
don’t go wrong”, was diﬃcult to do. It is a tremendous amount of work getting the
semantics and proving theorems about it anyway. It is rather non-modular: if you
change one bit, you tend to change other bits elsewhere. Adapting a theorem, or
checking that it still holds, is a big task. That’s not a very good example, but I’m
sure there are others I could think of if I had enough time.
If you look at something like Ocaml, which I think is currently the most advanced
dialect of ML, it is the ﬁrst such language that is pragmatically viable. You can use
it do do most things other than low-level programming. Are you surprised at what it
looks like, what’s in it, what’s omitted? Is it how you expected it to be? For example
you have modules and objects, although these two concepts overlap signiﬁcantly.
I think that’s a wonderful story of how a language can evolve and still remain very
robust. But carrying rigorous semantics through that evolution would be very diﬃ-
cult and that is something we will have to solve for future languages. I think Caml
is a terriﬁc success because it shows that a language which began as a theoreti-
cal undertaking can nevertheless achieve what any engineering language can also
achieve.
But the most successful language of all, C, came about because someone wanted to
write computer games on some spare machine, so it’s not always through engineer-
ing eﬀorts that languages succeed.
That’s true. But it’s also not through semantic eﬀorts that good languages come
about. We have to resolve something there and I think that’s very relevant to con-
currency languages.
When did you stop being involved with the ML eﬀort?
I went on being involved. We produced the formal semantics in 1990. I was very
much involved up to that. We then revised it in ’97. That was a lot of work, but
certainly not full-time, modifying the semantics.
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By that time my main eﬀort was deﬁnitely in concurrency, trying to understand
concurrency intellectually. I’m beginning to regard it as more of a modelling exer-
cise than a language exercise. We are modelling what happens in the world, like
Petri modelling oﬃce processes, if you like. We are not looking for the smallest
set of primitives that can make sense of computation. In fact, we are in a state of
tension: we are looking for a small set of primitives, but they have to ﬁt well with
what goes on, not only microscopically, but also macroscopically, with what goes
on in the world.
That was to me the challenge: picking communicational primitives which could be
understood in systems at a reasonably high level as well as in the way these systems
are implemented at a very low level. To some extent I think we have succeeded. In
CCS and CSP the communicational primitives are robust with change of level of
abstraction to some extent. But still, the emphasis ought to be on modelling what
happens in real systems, whether they are human-made systems like operating sys-
tems, or whether they exist already. There’s a subtle change from the Turing-like
question of what are the fundamental, smallest sets of primitives that you can ﬁnd
to understand computation. I think some of that applies in concurrency, like nam-
ing: what is the smallest set of primitives for naming? So some of that applies. But
as we move towards mobility, understanding systems that move about globally, you
need to commit yourself to a richer set of semantic primitives. I think we are in a
terriﬁc tension between (a) ﬁnding a small set of primitives and (b) modelling the
real world accurately.
Can you describe the development from CCS to Pi in its historic timeline? What was
your ﬁrst concurrency formalism and how did you change it? What didn’t work?
How was it perceived?
I think it’s an interesting story. I was working with what I called Behaviour Algebra
in 1978. The set of primitives included parallel composition, preﬁxing and those
things. I wanted to make this small set of primitives do everything or do as much as
possible, and to understand them semantically, preferably in Domain Theory; but
that didn’t work. The idea of labelled transition systems became very important
because it was a replacement for what didn’t work, which was encoding things into
Domain Theory. Because encoding things into Domain Theory, the equivalences
became either too rich or too poor, I mean too big or too small. They didn’t hit
what I regarded as correct notion of behavioural equivalence. There seemed to be
something inescapably missing in Domain Theory in respect to this. So labelled
transition systems – following on from Gordon Plotkin’s work on operational se-
mantics and bringing the idea of labels in – became central.
But automata already had labels!
Yes, that’s true, they did, and Keller had labelled transition systems. The idea of
a label being, as it were, a vehicle of interaction became totally important. So it’s
hard to know where it came from: Keller with his labelled transition systems, or
An Interview with Robin Milner / Electronic Notes in Theoretical Computer Science 162 (2006) 3–3616
automata theory? Making it a shared action was already present in Petri to some
extent. But doing it algebraically and compositionally, that was an important thing.
When I gave lectures in Aarhus in ’79, that was essentially how the book on CCS
evolved. What you are asking about is how it developed. What people perhaps
don’t know is that I was talking to Mogens Nielsen there and we were really trying
to make the Pi-calculus work at that time. I remember vividly discussions in his
oﬃce in Aarhus, and we couldn’t make it work. So CCS became the Pi-calculus
without communication of channels.
You were aware that CCS had shortcomings? You didn’t think you had hit on the
right formalism and later changed your mind.
Absolutely not. But it seemed to me – and later all the more – that it was good
not to go the whole way, because there was a certain nice, manageable modesty
about concurrency in CCS – same thing with CSP, really. You have two levels: you
have data and then you have that data being moved around, but you don’t have
the one feeding on the other. You like to move the values around, but not to move
the means of movement. It was very important, I think, to see concurrent calculi
without movement. Because then you could see how much could be done without
movement. And the answer is: a tremendous amount could be done. The CSP
people have shown that. A tremendous number of systems can be handled. And
then you could begin see just where the barrier lay, what things you couldn’t model.
Anyway, whatever justiﬁcation you could have for inventing something without mo-
bility, Mogens Nielsen and I tried to get it to work for the label passing, but we
didn’t succeed. So then CCS became what it was.
Was there a theorem that you proved that made you think ”OK, CCS is deﬁnitely
interesting enough”? I admire that you said ”CCS is not quite right but it is still
already very interesting and we can use it to understand a lot of things”. I would
have been unhappy with it and thrown it away. Any particular key event, that made
you think ”wow, this CCS is jolly interesting, let’s run with it”?
Two key events: one is being able to prove that behavioural equivalences were
actually congruences. That wasn’t easy. I had been working on that previously.
Getting the idea that they were congruences made you feel that you are getting at
some new kind of essence, because then you could think of the congruence classes
as the ”real things” that you were talking about. These were the denotees of your
semantics. That it was a congruence was important because the primitives seemed
to be themselves, rather just an elegant set. If they had resisted this congruence
proof that would have been awful. That would have been the end of it.
The other thing was – and I think probably this happened not immediately, prob-
ably roundabout 1982 – when we discovered this logic ...
Hennessy-Milner Logic?
Yes. You could represent bisimilarity, which of course came about from talking
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to David Park, and previously was called ”observational equivalence”. Of course
it was the same relation, almost the same relation, but of course the bisimilarity
technology was terribly important. So, whichever one of them it was, it turned out
to be captured by the Hennessy-Milner Logic. The fact that you could write spec-
iﬁcations or you could have a very very simple logic which captures that relation
exactly ...
It is an inﬁnitary logic, so in some sense it is not simple.
Yes, it’s an inﬁnitary logic, it has summation, inﬁnite sums, but if you cut down,
you get quite nice a ﬁnitary logic, if you do certain things to CCS. It is not entirely
tidy, I agree, but it was close enough. I remember saying to some of the Petri-Net
people ”look, because we now have a logic that matches the behavioural equiva-
lence, isn’t that interesting”? I found they didn’t respond very well to that. In any
case, to me it was one of the events, which said — bar getting a few things right
and wondering about this inﬁnitary notion — that we were on the right track.
One thing that strikes me about process-calculists is their obsession with equivalences
and congruency. Other communities don’t care about these things and they don’t
understand why we do and we don’t understand why they don’t. If you agree with
my assessment, where does your obsession with these things, your aesthetic feeling
that they are important, stem from? A working programmer never deals with truly
compositional systems, they always have the operating system in the background.
Do you think it’s to do with your mathematical education? Because you have been
exposed to algebra?
Maybe. But also, in denotational semantics you have the idea that you understand
the meaning of a program and that the meaning is a function of some kind.
That appears to be a mathematician’s way of thinking.
Oh sure, absolutely. But you also believe that by doing it mathematically, you
provide a ﬁrm foundation which will enable people to go further, though they don’t
have any wish to know it.
Could it not be the case that the world of computation is not compositional?
Yes, but you have to push these things very hard. Somebody will say to you: ”of
course it’s not compositional, look at the operating system” and then you can say,
OK, wait a minute, we have to make the operating system one of the participants,
one of the agents in this population of agents that are interacting. We won’t achieve
compositionality until we’ve done that, until we make explicit that agency, until we
recognise all the agents that are there. We must ask ourselves, how are they in-
teracting? Is there a sense in which a single program interacts with the operating
system? All of those things need to be tackled. It’s almost as though we have
to prove that we can be compositional. Nobody will pay attention until we have.
Eventually people want, or I want them to want, to be able to talk about a process
in the same way that they talk about a function. That’s why I’m not interested in
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short-term gains!
About equivalences: you were originally thinking in terms of weak traces? And
through David Park you were lead to bisimulation?
Oh no, deﬁnitely not. The original book on CCS, in 1980, has something called ob-
servation equivalence and it has something called strong equivalence. Strong equiv-
alence, although it was not deﬁned in terms of maximal ﬁxpoints, coinductively,
turns out to coincide with bisimilarity. That’s because of the fact of image-ﬁnite
transitions. So strong equivalence coincides exactly, as it turns out, with strong
bisimilarity. But we missed the coinductive proof technique.
Weak observation equivalence turned out not to coincide quite, because it was de-
ﬁned as the limit of an omega-chain, each member slightly ﬁner than the previous.
It turns out that we were wrong to think the maximal ﬁxpoint would be reached as
the limit of a decreasing omega-chain. It has to go to a higher ordinal. Apart from
that diﬀerence, and that diﬀerence shows up only in quite a sophisticated way, we
already had weak bisimilarity, but not of course the bisimulation proof technique,
which is so important.
It was because David Park was visiting Edinburgh, I think in 1981. It was his
sabbatical and he was living in my house, reading my book and he came down at
breakfast time when I was washing the dishes and said ”there is something wrong
with this”. And then I said ”oh god, what’s wrong”? ”Well, this isn’t a maximal
ﬁxpoint”! And I said ”should it be?” or something and then we went for a walk and
the answer was: yes, of course! Not only do we have a coinductive proof technique
with wonderful gains, but we also have coincidence very nearly with what’s already
there.
So when we went for the walk; the main topic was: what should we call this thing?
David wanted to call it ”mimicry” and I said ”that’s diﬃcult to say, let’s call it
bisimulation”. He said ”that’s got ﬁve syllables” and I said, ”it doesn’t matter,
people will be happy with it”. I named it, but he brought the idea. In fact it was
so close to what I had done. But the proof technique, and the maths behind it –
it seems to me – are very much better than what I had in that ﬁrst book, where I
was proving inductively that things were ultimately equivalent by proving that they
were n-equivalent for all n; that was an inductive not a coinductive proof.
Who is David Park?
He did work originally on program schemata with David Luckham and Michael Pa-
terson. They were famous for their work on program schemata. This was before
Scott, so they were looking at the semantics of imperative programs, and looking at
the decidability of the equivalence of these things, under all interpretations of the
function symbols, and ﬁnding some very beautiful results. He got his PhD at MIT,
but he was English. Anyway, he was a great friend of mine. We knew each other
when I was in Swansea. Before we came together again on this concurrency stuﬀ,
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he had worked with mu-calculus and maximal ﬁxpoints. So he came prepared with
the maximal ﬁxpoint view.
People knew and cared about maximal ﬁxpoints before bisimulations?
Oh yes, very deﬁnitely. Maximal and minimal ﬁxpoints. David was a great expert
in the extraordinary richness that you get when you have a maximal and a minimal
ﬁxpoint operator in something like the mu-calculus. So he brought all that knowl-
edge to bear. To him it stuck out very strongly what I was doing wrong in CCS.
Essentially he came along with this thing and it ﬁtted in. When I wrote the book
in 1990, I tried to tell the story about how this ﬁtted in and how important it was.
Of course he died quite early, around 1990. It was important for me that he would
get just recognition for this. CCS was already designed, but this particular bisimi-
larity technique seemed to be very important, at least for those of us who believe in
equivalence and congruence. The reason that that’s so important is that by doing
that we are getting at some kind of denotation of processes.
Even now I am talking with Tony Hoare, who is much more interested in the idea
of what it means for a program to meet its speciﬁcation. We are now trying to
reconcile the CCS approach that regards denotations as congruence classes, and the
CSP which talks about set-theoretic denotations such as failures and traces and
so on, and has very nice ordering relations, so that if the speciﬁcation is larger
than the implementation it means that the implementation is correct. The ordering
notion between processes is of course the other main important thing in process
calculi. I think we want both; we want the notion of denotations, and perhaps
they are congruence classes, and we want the orderings or preorderings representing
improvement of, or reﬁnement from, a speciﬁcation.
What is the inverse of these reﬁnement relations? I suspect it is related to transac-
tions?
I suppose there is not a symmetry here. If somebody states a speciﬁcation, then
what they are saying is: I want a program to satisfy this and there would be many
diﬀerent programs that satisfy it. To produce any one program that satisﬁes this is
satisfactory. Given that program, you could reﬁne it further and it would of course
still satisfy the original speciﬁcation because that is the reﬁnement ordering. But
coarsening it might mean that it then would not satisfy that speciﬁcation that it
originally did, because you would coarsen it in a diﬀerent direction. So coarsening
doesn’t have the same pragmatic interest. I think that’s a fair way of putting it.
Of course one is often not interested in the execution details. One sometimes wants
to see a large chunk of commands as an atomic blob, one wants to forget most of
the details.
Maybe you are talking about a diﬀerent abstract machine, modelling at a diﬀerent
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level of abstraction.
Yes, but isn’t reﬁnement the inverse to that? You have a command that says ”send
message from x to y” and when you reﬁne that, it becomes ”send message from x to
a, from a to b, from b to c and from c to y” ...
I think that’s a diﬀerent kind of reﬁnement. Say you state a speciﬁcation in logic.
You say that all communication must satisfy the following formulae. That allows a
whole space of programs to satisfy that. But they will all be talking about commu-
nications at a particular level of abstraction. You’ve got the idea of diﬀerent levels
of abstraction as orthogonal to the question of reﬁnement. Maybe some people will
call abstraction reﬁnement, maybe there’s confusion ...
Probably me who confuses things!
But I think everybody is confused about that. Diﬀerent levels of abstraction is not
the same thing as reﬁning from a speciﬁcation to an implementation.
You talked to Mogens Nielsen in Aarhus and you published your CCS book. What
came next? You were still pushing towards mobility I guess? How did the transition
to Pi come about? It seems to me that the key steps were collapsing everything into
names and ﬁnding the labelled transitions that make this work. Is that correct?
Yes. You know the paper by Nielsen and Engberg?
I have seen it being cited. I have not personally read it.
It is in ”Proof, Language and interaction” (MIT Press), a collection of essays writ-
ten for me in 2000, edited by Gordon Plotkin, Colin Stirling and Mads Tofte. I can
show it to you. Nielsen and Engberg, in ’86, wrote a paper called ”A calculus of
communicating systems with label passing”. The point is that they got over one
of the diﬃculties that Mogens and I had found. So they contributed a substantial
step towards the Pi-calculus in that paper. They never published it then. Now it
was published in that book of essays. We (Joachim Parrow, David Walker and I)
cited their original report in our ﬁrst paper on the Pi-Calculus. And we put some
kind of summary of what we thought they had contributed and what we had added
to it to make the Pi-Calculus. The interesting thing is, as I remember talking to
Mogens back in 1980, one of the things that didn’t ﬁt was the CCS renaming op-
eration, which is subtly diﬀerent from substitution of new names for existing names.
Because renaming can be inﬁnitary?
No. It’s the fact that applying a renaming operator at the outside of a process is
diﬀerent from doing a syntactic substitution of names throughout that process. As
I remember, Mogens and I didn’t succeed in making the label passing work, and one
of the reasons was because of that renaming operator. Now if you look at Engberg
and Nielsen’s ECCS, Extended CCS they call it, that operator is no longer present;
they explicitly omit it..
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There may have been other reasons; I don’t remember why label-passing didn’t work
out in my talks with Mogens. In any case we didn’t make this big step towards
the Pi-Calculus that he and Uﬀe made later. Then, knowing that, Joachim Parrow,
David Walker and I worked very hard to try and get only one kind of name. Mogens
and Uﬀe had various kinds of name. We did quite a lot to simplify it down. We
experimented with the idea of only bound names in messages. We tried all sorts of
diﬀerent things to make sure that we weren’t missing a trick. It took us about three
years from about ’86, ’87, to ’88, ’89 to get it straight. It was a matter of not only
cutting things out, but making sure that you couldn’t cut any more out, since we
wanted it to be as close to deﬁnitive as we could. That was an interesting process
and I have kept a heap of memos that we all wrote. It always takes experimenting
with diﬀerent possibilities and there do seem to be quite a number of possibilities.
Did you have, as one of the possibilities, what we now call the asynchronous Pi-
Calculus, where you don’t have output preﬁxing and sums?
I think we wanted the sum because it gives you normal forms, and it gave us the
algebra for CCS. We were reluctant to do without that. It seemed to me that keep-
ing the sum, although perhaps not utterly necessary, gave you simpler applications,
simpler illustrations. And it was in the tradition of CCS anyway. It didn’t seem
to be safe to leave it out. I’m glad that people have done all sorts of things since,
indicating exactly when we need it and what it does to axioms.
I ﬁnd the story of the sum quite fascinating because although these calculi appear to
just have one computational operation, data exchange (names for Pi), if you have
unrestricted sums, there’s a second kind of silent communication that communicates
which summand is chosen. That is also what ultimately leads to unrestricted sum
being computationally more expressive. I always wondered if it had occurred to you
at the time that this additional communication was happening.
The way I thought about it in CCS (never mind the Pi-Calculus, because the prob-
lem arises just as much in CCS, particularly the fact that weak bisimulation is not
a congruence until you take care where summation is allowed) is this: It appears to
me that summation is like the superposition of states and that observation causes
the resolution of a sum into one or another of its states. For that reason it is a
much more esoteric combinator than parallel composition.
Of course input is a form of sum, just slightly more well-behaved.
Yes, slightly more well-behaved. Yes, I think that’s right. I agree that there’s some
overlap here between summation, parallel composition and input and so on. I don’t
know whether that’s fully resolved yet. There are problems still around, but people
are able to discuss them now in the context of the full Pi-Calculus. I think it’s good
to go on doing that. And I must admit that I gain more insight now that I look
at graphical models, because the way summation works in bigraphs is quite unex-
pected. It can mimic the CCS form of sum really quite closely. The Pi-Calculus is
a step towards more spatially conscious models with regions and something more,
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almost geometric, where we might get more insight into what summation does. I
think the Pi-Calculus beneﬁts from some kind of graphical story being told. Maybe
we shouldn’t go too far into that just now.
Who managed to ﬁnd the labelled transitions that pass scope and when? It seems to
me that that must have been a breakthrough.
I suppose so. The point is that it was always going to do that, if it worked. Even
when Mogens and I discussed it in the ﬁrst instance, that possibility was around. I
don’t think that was a late discovery. I think that was an inevitable consequence
of passing labels and doing it in the freest possible way.
But in CCS labels don’t have any internal structure. That is very diﬀerent in the
Pi-Calculus. I don’t know if the Pi-Calculus was the ﬁrst calculus to have a rich
structure in the labels ....
Do not confuse transition-labels, which have structure, with names which don’t
have structure. I think the Pi-Calculus was the ﬁrst calculus whose labels have an
almost embarrassing structure. The fact that you had to have restriction as part of
the labels, that was very worrying. In fact that’s what led me later to look at these
labels as contexts, because it seems to me that there’s got to be a story about when
you need more structure in the labels. It’s almost as though we were very lucky
in CCS that we didn’t need any extra structure. We had a little bit of structure:
we had the tau operation. That was all. The advent of the Pi-Calculus indicated
that more work had to be done on transition systems in general to see exactly when
labels should have structure. I guess we still haven’t got the answer.
Another thing that strikes me is that most formalisms have reductions rather than la-
belled transitions. Now, with chemical semantics, the presentation of the Pi-Calculus
is much much simpler than with labelled semantics. Yet the labelled transitions came
ﬁrst. Why?
Oh, that’s easy: you can’t do behavioural analysis with the chemical semantics.
By the way, chemical semantics is terriﬁc: it doesn’t supply labels, but it supplies
structural congruence – in the original form in fact. But I think the strength of
the labels is that you get the chance of congruential behaviour, because the labels
encapsulate what it is that an agent contributes to a reaction; not just whether it
can react, but what reactions it could conceivably take part in, if only somebody
else would do something.
It is a minimal representation of that!
A minimal representation of all the interactions it could conceivably take part in and
what it could contribute to them. That’s the intuition of why they supply congru-
ences. That to me is very simple. You need this notion of what an agent contributes.
Labelled semantics does two things: it gives the semantics of the raw processes,
the computational steps and it helps you reason about the congruences. Reduction
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semantics just does the ﬁrst thing and then you have some horrid rules about con-
gruences and you need some nice tools to reason about this.
I agree.
The concept of names and naming is very important in your work. When did it
occur to you that this is a fundamental notion in computing? That you have these
points where you can interact, that you can hide. Did you have a speciﬁc moment
of revelation or is it the result of years of research?
I don’t want to be wise after the event, but I think it was when we found out that
you could encode data as processes with name passing.
That was when the Pi-Calculus already existed?
I’m not sure, you see. I think we probably felt that we were going to be able to
do this. That made us conﬁdent that you can get all the data, not by means of
other kinds of objects, but as processes. And the way you access the data is via
interaction and the interaction is via names. I don’t know at which point it would
have happened, possibly in our memos we wrote (and kept) over a period of about
two or three years, we may have something that suggests that it’s going to be OK
just to cut down to names because we going to be able to get data from processes. I
think it was quite an early thing, because I don’t think we we would wanted to put
the Pi-Calculus forward without knowing that there was going to be a story about
data. So, although we did the story about data later, probably not ﬁrst paper, we
said something about it in our ﬁrst paper.
Did it ever worry you that your names were pure, had no internal structure, whereas
all the names in computing applications heavily rely on internal structure?
No that didn’t worry me because all practical computing has to build towers of
structure in order to get something useful. What is interesting is the role of match-
ing and mismatching. I just wrote a little paper called ”What’s in a name?” in
honour of Roger Needham, who died earlier this year; around 1990 he wrote a pa-
per on pure names, from the point of view of operating systems. Do you know that
paper? (”Naming”, in Distributed Systems (ed. Sape Mullender), Addison-Wesley
1993).
Yes.
That was written more or less at the time of the Pi-Calculus. So I thought I would
write a paper to see what you could do with pure names. And I conjectured that the
Pi-Calculus is doing something like all of the things you can do with pure names.
You can create them, you can use them to call, you can use them in what I call a
co-call, so communicating is two things going on: you can call on a name and you
can co-call on a name. Co-call is the negative, call is a positive, if you like. And you
can test names. And synchronised action is the coming together of a calling and a
co-calling. You can tell a story which says: this is perhaps all you can do with pure
names. Is there anything else – that’s a challenge – you can do with pure names?
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The Pi-Calculus could be regarded as just supplying a minimal environment to al-
low you to do all the things with pure names, that you could imagine doing with
them. This paper is about six pages long and I’m telling a story which other people
would recognise; it’s nothing particularly new.
I think that pure names are now seen to occupy a terribly important place in the
foundations of computing. And that’s not just because of the Pi-Calculus, the op-
erating systems people know about it as well. In that paper I include an example of
Roger Needham’s about using composite names in, say, directories. It shows that
composite names, at least in simple cases, can be represented by a mixture of use of
pure names together with matching and mismatching. So I think that the control
structure of the Pi-Calculus together with pure names actually gives you what you
need for composite names, but it would be hard to prove that.
One of the main uses for composite names is eﬃciency, because when you pass a
composite name, you communicate not only the point of interaction but also, in
some sense, how to get there. This brings me to the great schism in the theory of
computing between semantics and complexity. There’s currently virtually no con-
nection between the two. Did you ever try to combine the two? Do you think that in
the future, when the two will have been reconciled, all the nice mathematical struc-
ture that you and your colleagues have developed will survive in a recognisable form?
I’m beginning to think that it’s perfectly OK for complexity theory and modelling,
or semantics, to be two aspects of computation theory that are not necessarily
mutually explicable. In other words, they’re independent. I don’t think that we
will make a breakthrough which consists of uniting them, by changing some of the
primitives from one side or the other. Shannon had a quantitative theory of infor-
mation, and that does not seem to tell us about structure at all, about structure
of communications. It simply tells us how few or how short messages can be and
that’s very exciting, but I don’t see any reason why we should expect these things
to come any closer to each other.
I disagree. For a start there are typing systems that control very tightly what kind of
recursion you can have and that has ramiﬁcations for complexity. And intuitively,
as a programmer, complexity is part of the semantics of a program: if popping an
element from the stack takes n3 steps where n is the number of elements on the
stack, it’s not a stack, it’s nonsense. If I’m a customer, if I pay a million pounds
for a program that ﬂies my airplane, I want a proof: not only that it works correctly
but also that it computes all its results in time. I certainly hope that the two will
eventually be merged, it may just be very hard to get there.
Maybe I was too strong. Being able to create types which have implications for com-
plexity is important, but that doesn’t mean that complexity theory is then taken
over by semantics. It’s more that we can ﬁt ourselves into certain categories or com-
plexity classes by various means. I don’t know enough about logics for complexity;
descriptive complexity –involving specialised logics– is well advanced. Maybe the
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logicians will refute what I was saying. I don’t feel that it’s high on the priority list
for us to try to do the union. The reason is that we have so much structure we’re
trying to model, particularly with the internet and the populations of machines –
even nano-machines, if you admit nanotechnology – that we have to try to grasp.
It’s like algebra has not much to do with complexity. Algebra is about structure.
We have to grapple with structure, perhaps as a higher priority. Perhaps I should
retreat into that position.
You mentioned Shannon’s theorem and you said that the key primitive is calling and
co-calling. To me all this is about communication. Communication is the key thing
that happens. What strikes me about these process-theoretic models is that commu-
nication isn’t directly captured as an entity with structure. It is in the formalisms,
but there is no algebra of communications. We can say a name is this or that, a
process is this, but there doesn’t seem to be a corresponding account of communica-
tion. Have you ever wondered about this?
My ﬁrst reaction is: I don’t see why there should be an algebra of something in
order for it to be a primary entity. The clue may be that, since communication is
about interaction, in order to make a full story about communication you need to
have some notion of the structure of actions which sits alongside the names that
represent the contiguities of agents. What process calculi are trying to do is to say
something about the structure of actions as well as about the elementary interac-
tions. And you can’t say much interesting about the elements of interaction which
are just the names, unless you have structure of actions as well.
I’m agreeing with you, you can’t use names without also having something else. If
you’re going to have a nice theory, you got to have something else around. So what
process calculi try to do is have the minimal amount of extra around to get a good
story. I agree with you, it’s puzzling. But that’s rather beautiful. You can’t get at
the names. They are a little bit like quarks. You can’t separate out the names from
the things which are naming.
I’m happy to press ahead with what you may call phenomenological theory. To look
at the phenomenon of names and then see if we can tell nice stories about names in
various diﬀerent calculi. And then perhaps we get to know more as we look at the
diﬀerent calculi. For example it comes up with all the geometrical calculi, spatial
calculi. Names seem to represent the contiguity of these things. So we may get a bet-
ter feeling for names from that slightly diﬀerent geometrical presentation of actions.
All your published calculi feature point-to-point communication. Have you thought
about other forms like broadcasting or the more wave-like communications that we
seem to be seeing in physics?
I always though broadcast would be a derived operation.
I’m not sure. There are separation results that seem to suggest otherwise.
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Maybe. KVS Prasad has done a nice theory of CBS (Calculus of Broadcasting Sys-
tems).
If I remember their work correctly, Ene and Muntean have shown that broadcasting
and point-to-point are separated by some reasonably natural conditions.
That’s interesting. It always seemed to me that point-to-point was a more modular
notion, a more controllable thing. Broadcast seems to require some medium within
which your message is ﬂoating even though it isn’t accessed. It always seemed to
me important that there should be be no place where a message is ﬂoating, unless
that place is itself modelled as an agent. So it seemed to me that point-to-point
captured that particular attitude more directly. But, point-to-point being just two
taking part, I did work with synchronous CCS which had prime names; each agent
could be synchronising several prime names, essentially requiring several things to
occur in a single interaction. That seemed to me to be rather nice. But somehow
synchronous CCS doesn’t seem nearly as useful as CCS.
The other thing is that CSP talks about engaging in an action as many agents as
possible. Any number of agents can engage in the same action. CSP has had lots
and lots of applications, but I’m not quite sure how much they have taken advan-
tage of this possibility of many agents engaging part in the same action. I’m really
rather puzzled by all that and I seem to have taken the path of two participants.
Others may take other paths.
Some recent developments take Pi-Calculi into maybe expected, maybe unexpected
directions: I mean modelling biological interaction on the DNA level in terms of Pi-
Calculi. Did that surprise you or did you always think that your models are more
general, that they don’t just talk about conventional computation?
It took me by surprise when I ﬁrst heard Ehud Shapiro at the Weizmann Institute.
He came and gave us a talk about it. Two things struck me. First of all he re-
ally needs something more spatial. So I suggested to him that he used Ambients.
Which he is now doing. In fact, Cardelli is now working with Shapiro. Cardelli has
invented the term ”Biograph” which represents the application of Ambients to bio-
logical phenomena. What my Bigraphs are trying to do is to combine Ambients and
Pi-Calculus. There is a coming together of these things. Certainly I was initially
surprised and then I realised that it was perhaps the geometrical thing, the spatial
thing, together with some mobility that really is what the biological people need. I
don’t know what combination of these things is best for them. But certainly I think
there’s a lot to be gained by looking for it.
You think it will not just be the biologists who will get a better tool to work with but
that we will also gain novel insights from their modelling eﬀorts?
We must look at what the biologists need and say: they are using some of what
we do perhaps, but is there something that they want which we are not giving
them? Cardelli thinks so. He talked to me that other day about a new class of
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calculi where action takes place on the membrane boundaries themselves, rather
than within or outside the cell. So it may well be that we get very strong insights
from them. What we should be doing is trying to join it all up all the time; they
may get insights for our possible or actual applications, and we get them from theirs
as well. We must try to keep the whole thing under control to make sure that we
do something which is as relevant as possible to both without being prolix, in other
words, without creating something which has a lot of bells and whistles. We are
trying to ﬁnd fundaments. We should always be open to diﬀerent applications, in
case they can help us focus on a better fundamental notion.
Something that has always puzzled me is how domain theory became so dominant as
a paradigm. I suspect that it’s because of Scott’s amazing result that tempted a lot of
people to work in the domain theoretic way, partly because he reuses a lot of conven-
tional mathematics that people might have been familiar with. I suspect that in the
late ’60s there was a lot of work on formalising semantics and people were going in
diﬀerent directions and then Scott came along ... Do you agree or disagree with this?
Yes, I think domains, which Scott also called ”Information Systems”, are to do with
how much information you need in order to do such and such. Somehow this was
very satisfactory, because it gave you a nice theory of function calls and interaction
and higher-order functions. All of those things could ﬁt together in the notion of
ﬁnite quantities of information.
What I didn’t understand is why we couldn’t immediately transfer that domain
theory to work properly for concurrency. The ﬁrst thing that I did in ’73, ’74 was
to try to represent non-deterministic processes by powerdomains. In fact, I had
talks with Gordon Plotkin about powerdomains and Gordon eventually produced
the right deﬁnition of them. By itself, this gave no account of concurrency. But
nonetheless, one could then say ”OK, if I have powerdomains I can represent non-
deterministic processes, and perhaps I can also represent concurrent processes by
particular kinds of domains”. So I looked at domains of processes and looked at
the Plotkin powerdomain and it produced an equivalence which was too strong a
congruence. And I looked at the weaker powerdomains, the Hoare powerdomain
and the Smyth powerdomain, and they produced a congruence that was too weak;
I’m certain that these were accurate statements. What I couldn’t do was to get
something that was operationally both sound and complete, that captured what I
regarded as operational equivalence.
So, without understanding why domains weren’t working I said ”well, let’s look for
something else”. That’s where the notion of observational equivalence, or what sub-
sequently turned into bisimilarity, came from. And I still don’t know why domain
theory didn’t supply what was needed. Possibly a clue is that domain theory failed
in one other way: it failed to solve the Full Abstraction Problem for PCF. In fact
that seems to have been left to Game Semantics to do ...
And now Pi!
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Yes, but it’s the Game Semantics that does it. Pi can then tell the story of the
solution, it’s the notion of interaction, game-theoretic notion of interaction – am I
not right? – that gives the key to the full abstraction theorem.
Our Full Abstraction theorem is entirely in Pi, no reference to games whatsoever.
You take the Pi-Calculus, the conventional encodings of Lambda-Calculi into Pi and
apply a typing system to root out exactly those processes that could break Full Ab-
straction.
The initial papers by Abramsky, Jagadeesan and Malacaria and by Hyland and
Ong, I think, were talking about games. More recently this was connected to Pi.
Of course. The games people were deﬁnitely the ﬁrst.
I must say I don’t know the story terribly well since then. What they indicated
was something that domain theory didn’t have, which was to do with patterns of
interaction. Now that’s precisely what we’re into in a big way with concurrency.
Maybe for the full answer we will have to look for this development of game theory
and connect it to the Pi-Calculus. But I’m not sorry to have left domains behind
or at least adopted other ideas for a time, because we were able to look at the op-
erational phenomenon more directly. I think that’s been more important for a while.
If you look at programming languages that are really used, C, C++, Java. They
don’t contain much that wasn’t around in the late ’60s. Does that surprise you?
Does it disappoint you? People who buy programming languages seem to be happy
to ignore all the lessons the should have learned from semantics. Or hasn’t seman-
tics produced anything really worthwhile? Or is it something you don’t care about?
I do care that languages should be informed by theories. But they have been par-
tially informed; Ada had something like the CSP or CCS version of communication,
the ”alt” command representing waiting for one of several diﬀerent alternatives to
happen, so you could see parallel composition sitting in there behind the scene if
you look at it with a benevolent eye. So there was an inﬂuence, particularly of CSP
on Ada. And they both had an inﬂuence on the Lotos speciﬁcation language.
I actually think the best way forward for us now is to look at concurrent calculi
as modelling theories for modelling interactions, whether they occur in programs
or in outside programs. We should try to widen the scene. I’m hoping that things
like ubiquitous computing and nano-technology will make it absolutely necessary
for us to have theories for modelling populations of interacting agents with diﬀerent
mobile structure, because then we’ll be able to see that modelling is necessary in
order to understand those populations.
Languages should emerge from that. They should be treated as a part of a mod-
elling theory. Up to now I don’t think we had suﬃcient incentive to make sure that
our languages are close to scientiﬁc models. It’s only with the onset of computation
as a global phenomenon that modelling those interactions becomes so scientiﬁcally
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important that it is bound to have its eﬀect on programming languages.
I see it as unfortunate that languages haven’t been inﬂuenced. For example, type
structures could have avoided a lot of the Year 2000 problem. We know that nothing
serious went wrong, but in the two or three years before that people didn’t know
that it wasn’t going to go wrong. If they had used types, which had been around
for two decades, they would have been able to know that certain things couldn’t
go wrong. The theories were around, which would help people to know that cer-
tain things couldn’t happen, barring physical accidents or bad implementations of
course. We are used to the idea that theories can sit around and not be used. We
just have to accept it.
Any particular reason, anything about the semantics community that prevents dis-
semination of our results? Or does it just take 20 years to go mainstream?
I think it’s only when we move to concurrency that we have enough to claim that
we have a theory of computation which is independent of mathematical logic or
goes beyond what logicians have studied, what algorithmists have studied. We’re
only two decades on from that. We’re gaining conﬁdence, so we can say that this
could possibly be a model suitable for the world. We must push that. We must get
into nano-technology, into ubiquity and say: not only must we try model these, we
must be prepared to develop our models further, so that they do ﬁt those things.
In other words become actual scientiﬁc models in the sense of what really happens,
rather than modelling what happens in our clean, abstract world.
We were lacking in conﬁdence, I think we are gaining in conﬁdence. But we have
to push it outwards. That can only happen through modelling.
Can you tell me who your PhD students were and what they are doing now.
There are twentyone. Nineteen have completed and twentyone altogether. Who are
they all? George Milne worked on processes before we ever got around to process
calculi, and is a Professor in Australia. Avra Cohn and Raymond Aubin worked
with me on LCF.
That was in Edinburgh?
That was in Edinburgh. Avra married Mike Gordon and is busy with her family;
I last heard of Raymond at Concordia University, but he may have moved on long
ago. Mike Sanderson worked on recursion in CCS, and now teaches at Essex. Alan
Mycroft worked on ML but especially on abstract interpretation, and is here in
Cambridge.
Lu´ıs Damas did polymorphic type inference in ML, and I believe is in academic
computing still in Portugal. Brian Monahan also worked with LCF; he’s now a se-
nior researcher with HP Labs in Bristol, working in the Trusted Systems Lab. Kim
Larsen worked in concurrency, on a species of higher-order transition system; he
now leads a group in model-checking (UppAal) at Aalborg. Kevin Mitchell imple-
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mented CCS on an abstract machine with a network of processors; that’s interesting,
because he had trouble in expressing just how the implementation matched the orig-
inal. (The answer was invented later by Joachim Parrow: coupled simulation!)
KVS Prasad is at Gothenburg where he designed a successful calculus of broadcast-
ing systems (CBS). Mads Tofte did semantics of Standard ML and also provided
the theoretical basis for polymorphic types for references; he is now President of
the IT University in Copenhagen. Faron Moller worked on axioms for concurrency,
and the unique decomposition of processes; he’s now a Professor in Swansea. Dave
Berry worked on a generic form of operational semantics, and now works in the
National e-Science Centre in Edinburgh.
Is that the Berry of the Berry function?
No, that was Ge´rard Berry at INRIA. Chris Tofts worked on proof rules for concur-
rent programs; he later applied CCS to ant colonies and continues to apply process
calculi and logics to biology. Davide Sangiorgi designed higher-order Pi-Calculus
and laid its theoretical foundation; he’s now a professor at Bologna. Peter Sewell
proved that bisimilarity of ﬁnite state processes isn’t ﬁnitely axiomatisable (these
negative results are hard!); he now has a Royal Society Research Fellowship in Cam-
bridge, running a group on validating heavy-duty protocols. Dave Turner worked
on sorting in the Pi-Calculus, and designed the abstract machine for Pi which later
(with Benjamin Pierce) led to their deﬁnition of Pict.
Alex Mifsud worked on Action Calculi and control structures, went back to Malta,
and recently came to UK on a short-term work assignment but I’ve temporarily
lost track of him. Jamey Leifer worked with me on the maths of contextual labelled
transition systems, which now underpins Bigraphs; he’s currently at INRIA in Paris.
Those are all the people who have ﬁnished. Two people are coming up to ﬁnishing;
Alistair Turnbull whose topic is MIN, a linear graphical abstract machine-cum-
calculus which can underpin threaded languages like Java, and Ole-Hoegh Jensen
(collaborating with me by phone from Aalborg) on Bigraphs, especially how they
model both Pi-Calculus and Ambients.
That’s all. Most of them are still in computing. Some of them are very well known;
I’m proud of all of them. I was already 40 at the time I started, didn’t have ten years
of supervising that some people have. Also I never found it very easy to supervise
more then two people or three people at once.
What is your style of supervision? Is it laissez-faire or do you give them theorems
to prove?
I need to be closely involved, but I don’t give them theorems to prove. I work with
people. I don’t feel comfortable unless I know pretty much what’s going on. I don’t
like it if somebody went too far away from what we talked about, because then I
don’t know how to judge or whether his theorems work or not. That’s why I don’t
want to supervise more than two or three people at once. But of course I had some
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splendid interactions with those people and it is still continuing.
What were the major institutional obstacles or helper in your career? Did you ﬁnd
it easy to get funding? Or was it easy getting funding twenty years ago?
It was always OK. I never had a grant application turned down.
I can’t say that for myself.
I’ve almost always had two research associates working at some grant or other. Not
now any longer. I’m dating from 1973 when I started with the LCF work in Edin-
burgh. I always had perhaps a couple of students and a couple of research people
with PhDs already. So I always had a good ﬁve or six people working on what I
wanted. I have been very lucky in that way. It makes me sympathise with people
who sometimes get grant applications rejected. There is a lot of competition. I
think it is true that perhaps if they get to know you they will go on funding you. I
started at a time when the competition perhaps wasn’t so great. I didn’t have any
diﬃculties. All my diﬃculties have been created by myself.
Presumably being a fellow of the Royal Society and a Turing Award winner might
have helped?
I haven’t beneﬁted any more since that. I’ve always had the funding I wanted. Cer-
tainly people accept that I must have done something interesting. But that doesn’t
help particularly, because usually it’s people who don’t know what it is anyway. I
never seem to have beneﬁted with respect to my immediate colleagues since that –
they’re as critical as they always were!
The other day a physicist described computer science as an auxiliary science, not
a real science to me. When you started computing really was a new ﬁeld. Did you
ﬁnd that other more established ﬁelds looked down on your discipline or didn’t take
it seriously?
It’s not been a problem, except sometimes with perception within the university.
But then Edinburgh was always very good in this way. It was seen that comput-
ing was very important. Cambridge also. That wasn’t too much of a diﬃculty. I
think the view of other scientists sometimes takes one’s breath away. Physicists
clearly don’t think of anything we’re doing as science. Probably what they mean
is: it can’t be a science because we are always making things. What are we doing
science of? We are doing the science of our own constructions. But I think the
boundary between understanding one’s own constructions and understanding the
world is breaking down. You’ve only got to look at bioinfomatics. In chemistry, in
chemical engineering, there are structures which we are making which deserve to be
understood by the same models as we understand the natural world.
Ultimately physical theories must be able to describe physicists doing physics, i.e.
itself, because physicists and physical theories are part of the natural world.
That’s an interesting thought.
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But they are very far away from being able to do that.
I do think we have some problems. I was inﬂuenced by Herbert Simon. He talked
about the ”The Science of the Artiﬁcial”. He does point out the diﬃculty that our
science changes as we do it. We could not conceivably be talking about populations
of interacting agents unless we had the internet and nano-technology suggesting
them to us. We don’t have big enough imaginations, or it wouldn’t have been
worth starting. It becomes something worth starting. Once it’s worth starting we
can see that it might relate to the natural world, so we can actually use this blurred
boundary to be able to model both, what goes on in the real world and what goes
on with what we make. The internet is both a natural phenomenon just as much as
it was built. Nobody built the internet, in some sense. In some sense it happened
by means of a lot of contributory activity.
But compared with physicists we have a problem with verifying our ideas. Of course
we can determine whether something is a correct derivation in ZFC, but are our
deﬁnitions right? It is a diﬃcult problem.
Yes, it is.
Is it just aesthetics? What have your scientiﬁc controversies been about?
Say we worry about compositionality. We talk to the Petri-net people. In the past
they didn’t represent it. They said ”we can model the whole of a system”. Then
we said ”can you model the system that I’m building now and then model how
that would be synthesised with some other system”? They said ”we come along
afterwards and model the whole thing by a big net”. Then the controversy gets
resolved by what works well in practice. Our models seem to have to be justiﬁed
by pragmatic considerations. Take types. They get justiﬁed by certain errors that
don’t happen in programs.
There does seem to be quite a lot of mileage in justifying a theory because of how it
helps build things. I wish I could say this has the same purity as verifying a models
against the natural world. What we don’t have is repeatable experiments. That’s
the real weakness. We have to be able to validate our theories even though we don’t
have the luxury of repeating our experiments.
This predicament is shared with many other sciences, economics, sociology ...
And they are all regarded as second rate equally by the physicists. I don’t know
how we can get out of that. Unless again we do model something in the real world.
Possibly in Biology we may be able to. At the moment Shapiro at the Weizmann
Institute is verifying his models against what is happening in practise. If you equip
Bioambients or the Pi-Calculus or whatever, with probabilistic transitions, then you
can actually run the abstract model and compare the physical happening with it
and see whether that really agrees. I don’t know enough to how much credit to give
to it, but Shapiro says he does get agreement. So insofar as we are able to model
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real live things we perhaps can validate against the real world.
It is also the case that programming languages are getting better and programming
productivity is above what you would get in C.
Yes, and also a chap called Howard Smith who wrote a book called ”Business Pro-
cess Management – The Third Wave”. It’s the philosophy behind the language
BPML (Business Process Management Language), designed and implemented by
Assaf Arkin, who works for a for a small company called Intalio, in association with
BPML.org, a public domain institution which tries to understand business process
modelling. He based it on the Pi-Calculus. Assaf Arkin knows a lot about the Pi-
Calculus. Howard Smith and Peter Fingar, who wrote the book together, say that
as a result they get a better model of business processes than before. He claims,
because of Arkin’s work, that it does take its ideas from the Pi-Calculus, and that
they have been able to do things they could not do before. It seems very promising.
I don’t know very much about business processes. Greg Meredith at Microsoft was
also in on the beginning of this. There again you can get validation but not in the
pure, repeatable experiment form. No sooner we create these things and put them
into business process modelling languages, than people will redesign their business
processes, so we are no longer able to be talking about the same thing. We have to
ﬁnd some way of telling a story about this as a real validation even though it isn’t
one of the pure kind found in physics. I don’t know how to do that.
You worked for a computer company and you probably got involved with Microsoft
through the new Cambridge computer science building. What are your views on
collaboration with industry? Good thing? Bad thing?
I think it’s necessary. I don’t want to collaborate on products, but we are quite
lucky to have something like Microsoft Lab with ex-colleagues and people like Tony
Hoare and Luca Cardelli and Ce´dric Fournet. These people are clearly working on
abstract topics which we share, but they are also working with the product division,
probably doing things that we don’t know as well.
There is some sense of ideas ﬂowing along that chain, from the product people in
Seattle, say, through these researchers here, to me and to our students and going
back again. We don’t know what goes on further down the chain always, but we
are able to talk to people here. Fournet is doing some very interesting things, only
half of which I know, but we are still able to talk about the ideas behind them.
Similarly with Cardelli, I don’t know how much they are applying his work on Bi-
ographs, but he certainly has relationships with the program division that I don’t
know about. On the whole I’m happy with that. I don’t think I would be happy
to be closer to industry. I think there are long-term ideas about what is technically
viable that you can only work out if you have time to spend, if you haven’t got in-
dustrial pressure on you. I would rather be an academic so that there is no question
of having to survive that kind of pressure.
An Interview with Robin Milner / Electronic Notes in Theoretical Computer Science 162 (2006) 3–3634
What do you make of the increasing patenting of ideas in computing?
It’s terrifying. It’s ridiculous and terrifying at the same time.
I agree. I wouldn’t be surprised if there was some patent application of some minor
variant of the Pi-Calculus or some typing system. Is that something you discuss
with your peers when you have your government advisory meetings?
I haven’t done recently. I am aware that people ought to be doing this. I signed a
petition the other day which went on behalf of several European academics to the
European Parliament. But I must admit that we are interested in ideas that can
be patented and that enormous damage could be done by an invention, for example
in nano-technology, that could conceal some kind of misunderstanding. I think we
should ﬁght, but can’t claim to have done much ﬁghting myself.
Why is the Pi-Calculus called Pi-Calculus?
Very good question. You start from Lambda, Mu-Calculus already exists, you go
through the Greek alphabet. Nu was not very easy to pronounce and anyway it has
another perfectly good use now, so it was good to avoid that. Xi, I think comes
next: I wouldn’t want to call something the Xi-Calculus because its diﬃcult to say.
Omicron is the next one and that’s no good, because that’s just the composition
symbol. And Pi comes next.
But it already has another meaning.
It does, that’s true. But it also stands for permutations in another part of mathe-
matics. I think we are suﬃciently distant.
It’s not ”pi” for process?
It is ”pi” for process and ”pi” for pointer and parallel and a number of things. The
point is that there’s no really good reason. It did occur to me that it is something
very easy to say. Turns out that people do ﬁnd it easy to say. I didn’t want to use
an acronym, like CCS. I wanted to use something that is a pure name. It is a pure
name. It even sounds pure.
Does it lead to confusion sometimes?
No. It’s only things which are trying to mean something, but mean diﬀerent things
to diﬀerent people, that cause confusion.
Grand Challenges, that is my last question: why and what is it about?
You’re talking about the Grand Challenges Exercise initiated by the UK Computing
Research Committee (UKCRC). It seemed that we ought to express the scientiﬁc
aspiration of the computer science community. We should make clear that we aspire
not only to make things work but to have a science, an academic body of knowledge.
The ﬁrst thing about a Grand Challenge is that it is supposed to represent a bold
aspiration that is purely scientiﬁc; not on the back of some new funding initiative,
An Interview with Robin Milner / Electronic Notes in Theoretical Computer Science 162 (2006) 3–36 35
or thought up because it would be easy to ﬁnd practical applications within three
or four years. It is trying to look beyond all that and represent our academic interest.
You can ask how to translate these nice notions, of being independent of funding
and representing our academic interests, into something more speciﬁc. And then
you can say we don’t know what our aspirations are. So why don’t we ask people to
say what their aspirations are? That’s what we are doing, but in such a way that,
when they have said it and the community gets behind them, you create something
which has enough credibility that people are prepared to follow it through. For
example the community will create workshops in order to discuss how to address
those problems. In other words, the community will feel encouraged to plan its fu-
ture towards those objectives. And, incidentally, the Research Council might fund
workshops that try to design projects to approach the objectives.
That’s what we are trying to do. Of course these aspirations won’t stand still. Our
steady state should be a slowly rolling menu of aspirations, each of which is the
focus of a community. Of course, this is not just a UK community; the Grand Chal-
lenge Exercise is a way to maximise the part that UK communities play in truly
international research.
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